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Jefferson’s West Point - Political Development in Early U.S. Security Policy 
Preslav Mantchev 
Abstract: This essay evaluates a variety of national security visions put forth between the 
Revolution and War of 1812. It uncovers how a professional army became the prevailing 
national security apparatus during America’s nascent years. Additionally, special attention is 
given to Thomas Jefferson’s role in the process, which culminated in the establishment of a 
military academy at West Point. The essay argues that the academy’s creation advanced a 
professional army with characteristics particular for its time: a diverse and egalitarian force, 
bound to the ideals of republicanism.  
 
Introduction 
Thomas Jefferson’s illustrious career in government has maintained reverence for 
centuries. He is regarded as one of America’s most important statesmen, a legacy that became 
eternalized after his likeness was etched onto Mount Rushmore. It is not for this reason alone, 
however, that Jefferson has also been dubbed the “American Sphinx”. Even a brief overview of 
his statecraft compels scholars to notice a series of puzzling contradictions, especially regarding 
Thomas Jefferson’s approach to external affairs and more specifically, national security.  
Jefferson officially entered American politics as the man who wrote the Declaration of 
Independence. The Declaration was a “negative charter” which “articulated… rights against 
government” and embodied Americans’ lasting suspicion towards strong, centralized leadership 
(Lim 2013, 5). But, less than three decades later Jefferson would be overseeing the Marines’ 
occupation of Derna, a city all the way in the Mediterranean. Jefferson bitterly opposed 
Alexander Hamilton’s seemingly unconstitutional bank charter, yet went on to double the United 
States’ size by purchasing land on credit. He lamented military build-up under Washington’s 
Federalist administration, yet pushed for one of the largest expansions to date as president.  
At first glance, it is difficult to reconcile Thomas Jefferson’s military activism with his 
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role as poster boy of a political culture seemingly predicated against such practices. Parochial 
observers might lament his legacy as undoubtable evidence that power corrupts. However, upon 
a closer inspection of the Anti-Federalist movement that based its principles on “his” 
Declaration, it becomes easier to understand and appreciate our third president’s national 
security policy. He was part of a cosmopolitan, elite faction of a heterogeneous and dynamic 
movement. Jefferson’s presidential statecraft between 1801 and 1808 consisted of thoughtful, 
deliberate actions to advance his vision of a stable republic founded on personal freedoms, 
political participation, and class mobility. 
Perhaps the best embodiment of Thomas Jefferson’s statecraft was his establishment of 
the West Point Military Academy. He used the presidency as a forgotten, yet classic “instrument 
of negation” not by using its typical veto powers, but by exercising enumerated privileges in 
order to counteract a movement that was reticently aristocratic and had a tendency to erode 
liberty (Lim 2013, 53). From his first days as president, Jefferson turned a small garrison into a 
multi-tier school, which would more than quadruple its enrollment by 1808 (Crackel 1987, 538). 
The academy would train the army’s leading infantrymen, artillerists, cavalrymen, and engineers 
not only in military strategy, but also in math, foreign language, and science. Its foundation was 
a critical juncture which instituted a truly exceptional military: a force open to all socioeconomic 
classes, not bound to any idols except the United States Constitution.  
 
Federalists, Anti-Federalists, and National Security 
 As one conjures images of the American nation’s birth, it is hard to ignore tensions 
involving security policy. Even the hallmark rallying cry of the American Revolution - “no 
taxation without representation” - was reflective of a broken British security policy. King George 
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III’s exorbitant taxes were prompted by his ambitious desire to keep a standing army in North 
America and pay off debt from the Seven Years’ (French and Indian) War, a conflict whose 
spoils colonists could hardly enjoy after the Proclamation of 1763. After the colonies won the 
war of independence against Great Britain, discussions regarding national defense would not 
take a back seat. In fact, our first leaders were deeply engaged in answering a basic question that 
accompanies national independence: how should the government keep Americans’ liberty secure 
in an anarchic world filled with other self-interested powers?  
 Elvin T. Lim presents the birth of American governance as a constructive tension 
between adherents of two distinct “Foundings,” the Declaration of Independence and the United 
States Constitution. This debate, concerning the vital relationship between local and national 
government, is dubbed a “Lovers’ Quarrel” by Lim. It manifested itself most strongly during the 
state ratification conventions of 1787-1788. Federalists touting the writings of James Madison 
and Alexander Hamilton ardently advocated for replacing the Articles of Confederation with a 
document that gave the national government greater authority over the former colonies. Inter-
colonial issues such as the absence of a common currency undoubtedly bolstered their cause. The 
Federalists’ most vociferous argument, however, was one that presented the confederation of 
states as a vulnerable nation.  
Jonathan Marshall emphasizes how “the Federalists saw foreign predators on all sides 
ready to take advantage of America’s weaknesses” (1980, 234). The 1783 Treaty of Paris had 
ended the Revolutionary War, yet the “congress” of American negotiators had “only a limited 
power delegated by the thirteen sovereign states… [and] no obligation to bind them” (Keohane 
2002, 61). The former colonies acted unilaterally in repaying outstanding debts to Britain, but 
many were poor and nearing financial crisis. Furthermore, several southern states flat-out 
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“refused to honor the [1783] treaty’s provisions for the safe return of Loyalists and payments of 
debts to British merchants” (Keohane 2002, 61).  In response, the British felt no need to uphold 
their end of the peace deal. They refused to vacate forts on the western frontier and proceeded to 
arm several Indian tribes (Keohane 2002, 61). This policy exacerbated instability along the 
frontier. Additionally, the British chose to discriminate “severely against American trade” 
(Keohane 2002, 62) which was already hindered by frequent pirate attacks.  
Alexander Hamilton predicted that an economically troubled America, without a 
collective initiative to preserve national security, would cause “our liberties… [to] be prey to the 
means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other” (Marhsall 1980, 
237). He suspected that the former colonies’ collective action problem would sooner or later be 
turned against them by a conniving foe. Alternatively, a more centralized republican government 
would create a “strong and respected America [that] could live in peace with the Great Powers… 
Liberty would prosper under such an umbrella of calm and security” (Marshall 1980, 238). 
The Anti-Federalists voiced a rebuttal to Federalist suggestions for a new national 
arrangement. They did not deny that a strong national government and army would allow the 
U.S. to live among great powers. More precisely, they were skeptical whether this coexistence 
would be peaceful. A regular army would invite frequent wars, and precipitate the erosion of 
liberty back home. However, their rhetoric has been largely forgotten by everyday citizens. 
Jonathan Marshall notes that even scholars have assumed “‘anti-Federalists rarely discussed 
foreign affairs’ and when they did ‘they accepted Federalist arguments’” (1980, 238). As 
Marshall reveals, these misconceptions stem from Anti-Federalists’ “failure… to produce a 
unified body of political thought remotely comparable to the classic Federalist Papers” (1980, 
238). This is also partially why the Anti-Federalists lost the Constitutional debate. Their rhetoric 
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was scattered among “many speeches, pamphlets, and newspaper articles” (Marshall 19080, 
238). Indeed “the perception that few papers would publish material was fairly accurate” as 
printers and newspaper editors tended to favor the Federalists (Cornell 1999, 122). Nevertheless, 
Marshall demonstrates that despite their relative disorganization, Anti-Federalist writings did 
evoke alternatives to Federalist security proposals.   
To start, Anti-federalists “discerned no imminent foreign dangers, and concluded that the 
threat to liberty from a strong, consolidated government far outweighed the more remote terrors 
of a foreign invasion” (Marshall 1980, 239). Through mockery, some attempted to discredit 
Federalists’ message of fear. William Grayson, for example, satirized Federalist predictions: 
“‘Algerines, whose flat-sided vessels never came further than Madeira, are to fill the Chesapeake 
with mighty fleets… and the Carolinians from the south (mounted on alligators, I presume), are 
to come and destroy our cornfields…’” (Marshall 1980, 239). Grayson uses a straw-man 
argument, casting Federalists as irrationally fearful of distant, primitive people.  
The true dangers, Anti-Federalists posited, were remnants of “a severe and tedious war… 
that disturbed the course of commerce, introduced floods of paper money, the stagnation of 
credit, and threw many valuable men out of steady business” (Marshall 1980, 241). Conditions 
were improving slowly but surely, and this process could be best maintained by a “frugal, free, 
and mild government” (Marshall 1980, 241) under the Articles of Confederation. This quote was 
drawn by Jonathan Marshall from the writings of Richard Henry Lee. Alongside William 
Grayson, Lee is identified by historian Saul Cornell as an “elite Anti-Federalist” – a man who 
had the luxury of being born into privilege, was well-educated, and maintained cordial relations 
with leaders across the seaboard, even Federalists.  
Characterized by their tempered rhetoric, elite Anti-Federalists saw their “duty as 
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freemen and citizens to consider ‘measures,’ not ‘men’” (Cornell 1999, 38). William Grayson’s 
sarcastic mockery of Federalist arguments was about as far as his critique would go; ad-hominem 
attacks were unthinkable. Instead, elite Anti-Federalists approached the Constitutional debate 
along the principle of disinterested virtue. “Men like Richard Henry Lee… believed that matters 
of public concern ought to be discussed and debated in correspondence with other men of 
influence” (Cornell 1999, 78). They saw it as their duty to look out for those below them. Each 
man sought to suspend their personal stakes, using knowledge and reason to reach a solution that 
would benefit the greater public good. Accordingly, elite Anti-Federalists presented clear and 
tempered critiques of the Constitution, and feasible remedies. Thus, it is easy to grasp Lee’s 
notion of a “frugal” government. It involved an institution fundamental to national security, but 
also expensive: the armed forces.  
Federalist designs for an army went beyond the Constitution’s codifications. As early as 
1783, George Washington and Alexander Hamilton had petitioned the Confederation for a 
“multi-tiered [national defense] system” (Katznelson 2002, 94). The system consisted of “(1) a 
capable Navy to protect commerce; (2) state militia service for all men between eighteen and 
fifty; (3) a volunteer militia under national control; and (4) a regular army ‘to awe the Indians, 
protect our Trade, prevent the encroachment of our neighbors of Canada and the Floridas, and 
guard us at least from surprises…’” (Katznelson 2002, 94). As one may guess, “the post-
independence Congress failed to agree on this or alternative designs,” sectional rivalry being the 
main impediment (Katznelson 2002, 94). Thus, Hamilton’s warning in the Federalist papers 
about Americans “defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other” was 
more than a pessimistic foreshadowing (Marshall 1980, 237). It conveyed a reality he had 
already observed.  
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The proposed Constitution made the President “Commander-in-Chief” and gave 
Congress explicit authority to raise an army and levy taxes. Anti-Federalists viewed this as an 
attempt at circumventing state resistance against Washington and Hamilton’s original plan. They 
took greatest issue with the prospects of a “regular,” or in colloquial terms, “standing” army. A 
standing army was antithetical to the idea of frugality. Stationed soldiers would consume 
government funds even during times of peace, which would inevitably come out of state coffers. 
A much more cost-effective alternative, expressed by Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists in their 
Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority was a “prohibition of standing armies in times of 
peace,” replaced by a “military… under civilian control… [and] return of control of militia to the 
states” (Cornell 1999, 33). These suggestions were inextricably tied to Anti-Federalists’ call for a 
right to bear arms that later became the Constitution’s second amendment. With a public armed 
and ready, armies could be quickly assembled and disbanded democratically. The cost borne by 
such forces would be limited to their equipment and compensation during time of conflict.  
Armies’ “civilian control” does not imply that Anti-Federalists sought to remove the 
president’s title of “Commander-in-Chief” or transfer commanding authority to Congress. In 
fact, Anti-Federalists expressed concern that Congress would be too powerful as well, since it 
possessed both the privilege of funding armies and declaring war (Kistler 2011, 467). Anti-
Federalist thinkers insisted that states should have control over armed forces, since they “were 
the true expression of people’s political will” (Cornell 1999, 63). They were strong adherents to 
Baron de Montesquieu's idea that republicanism could flourish only within small, homogenous 
political units. The American public would be safest from despotism, so long as their state 
governments had a strong say in questions regarding collective defense.  
This logic explains Anti-Federalists’ desire to preserve militia chapters. Aside from being 
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able to counter immediate threats to American security, militias also embodied local values and 
interests that would not be lost to the dogma of generals and politicians at the national level. 
They would be an important safeguard against the possibility of a subversive despot exploiting a 
security crisis to consolidate power. Contrary to common perceptions, a budding tyrant does not 
need an internal struggle to justify their personal expansion of power. In Napoleonic France, for 
example, foreign threats would prove to be sufficient precursors in allowing a military regime to 
take hold at home.  
Saul Cornell’s “Middling” Anti-Federalists voiced support for militias most consistently. 
This group includes authors such as James ‘An Old Whig’ Hutchinson and ‘Federal Farmer’. 
Hutchinson and Melancton Smith, suspected by experts to have co-authored the ‘Federal Farmer’ 
writings (Cornell 1999, 88), were both active intellectuals in their respective communities. These 
men’s everyday roles motivated them to value the importance of local decision-making and 
interests. They had little experience with the intricacies of international conflict, but their 
appreciation of order allowed for a productive relationship with elite Anti-Federalists and 
Federalists.   
Federal Farmer expresses Anti-Federalist designs for national defense most vividly: “‘A 
militia, when properly formed, are in fact the people themselves…’ State control of the militia 
‘places the sword in the hands of the solid interest of the community, and not in the hands of men 
destitute of property, of principle, or of attachment to the society and government’” (Cornell 
1999, 93). It is noteworthy how Federal Farmer placed barriers on many individuals from 
influencing community defense, not only distant rulers. He was wary that men who were poor, 
unreligious, or uneducated could be easily manipulated by demagogues. To avert this from 
happening, middling Anti-Federalists alluded to the 2nd amendment’s “well-regulated” clause: 
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“Federal Farmer endorsed the right to bear arms, but he linked that right to an individual’s 
responsibility to be trained in arms, submit to state control, and demonstrate he was not a 
dependent” (Cornell 1999, 93). States’ control of the militia did not simply mean ownership; it 
implied a strict level of oversight as well. 
In sum, the quintessential Anti-Federalist security arrangement was controlled by 
individual states. Each state would compose its own security body, either through mandatory 
conscription or voluntarism. State militias were virtuous through careful vetting. Participation 
criteria for militia service was likely similar to states’ voting requirements at the time. The 
service would only be open to men who demonstrated sufficient knowledge of the state 
constitution or the bible, and provided proof of their education and assets. These citizen-soldiers 
would not lose virtue in the chaos of combat, or exploit the chaos for self-gain. On a national 
scope, this security arrangement was diffuse. The national government only had a supporting 
role. Its authority was granted by the states, and would only expand under extreme 
circumstances. This decentralized structure slowed collective security action, making it even 
impossible at times. The Anti-Federalist security arrangement made up for this deficiency by 
ensuring that the most severe consequences of improper security action would be confined to 
single states. If one state succumbed to tyranny, the others would be immune for the time being.     
 
Radical Anti-Federalists and the Carlisle Debacle 
Aside from Washington and Hamilton’s strong regular army, the other alternative to 
middling Anti-Federalists’ model of state militias was a distinctly localist idea. Dubbed “radical 
polemicists” and “plebeian populists” by Saul Cornell, authors such as Centinel and Aristocrotis 
were suspicious of a well-regulated state militia almost as much as they were of a centralized 
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national government. These authors “were among the most widely reprinted during ratification,” 
particularly due to their scathing rhetoric (Cornell 1999, 100). Given their mass appeal, it is 
likely that their incisive writings invited the stereotype observed by Jonathan Marshall, which 
posited Anti-Federalists as “men of little faith”.   
William Petrikin, a “self-described ‘mechanic’ and tenant farmer,” wrote under the name 
Aristocrotis (Cornell 1999, 107). He viewed regulation of the militia as a way “to disarm the 
peasants [vis-a-vis] the farmers, mechanics, and labourers” (Cornell 1999, 108). Aristocrotis 
valued a society in which participation in the armed forces was not “tied to property 
requirements” (Cornell 1999, 109). He was suspicious of all higher authority, and advocated for 
an ongoing revolution. The government would be held in check by individuals’ ability to 
spontaneously revolt. 
This idea of national security did not take long to be discredited, however. In late 1787, 
Federalists in the town of Carlisle, Pennsylvania gathered to celebrate the state’s ratification of 
the Constitution. The festivities got broken up by an angry mob of Anti-Federalist rioters, who 
went on to celebrate their symbolic victory by burning effigies of famous Federalists (Cornell 
1999, 110). Rioters also destroyed a celebratory cannon. They declared it “‘was the property of 
the United States, that what belonged to the United States belonged to the People; that they were 
the People, and consequently had a right’ to confiscate it” (Cornell 1999, 113). Local authorities 
arrested several rioters on charges of assault, and detained them after they refused to make bail. 
In response, militia units from the surrounding areas sent representatives to meet with officials 
and press for prisoners’ release. 
Saul Cornell stresses how “Anti-Federalists in Carlisle actually acted out the suggestions 
of the most radical essayists” (1999, 110). The mob-rule that materialized, and its disregard for 
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basic assembly and property rights completely discredited the localist conception of collective 
security. Local militias drew their membership from inherently narrow sections of the 
population. Their voluntarism dubiously blended with self-initiative. Self-initiative was easily 
guided by self-interest. If unrestrained, self-interest was antithetical to virtue. Radicals’ rejection 
of any constitutive criteria for militias meant that virtually any group, regardless of its size or 
values, could take up arms. If one were to evaluate local militias amongst each other, it would 
not take long to recognize they asserted a dizzying array of various interests. At the same time, 
there was no hierarchy that could reconcile differences among these bodies or formulate a set of 
collective action goals. Even the most mundane issues could be securitized and turn into armed 
conflict. This institution - or lack thereof - bred anarchy, not security.        
The Carlisle Riot “split the two most democratic wings of the Anti-Federalist coalition 
apart” as Middling Anti-Federalists rejected anarchy and mobocracy, having themselves been 
victims of Federalist riots (Cornell 1999, 118). This schism produced a new Anti-Federalist 
coalition between middling politicians and elite executives, planters, and traders. As more and 
more states decided to ratify the Constitution and amend it with the Bill of Rights, the “quarrel” 
would transition from a question of if to a question of how. Behind the backdrop, states would 
retain the ability to organize militia units. But the regular army would be here to stay. Under the 
spotlight, Federalist and Anti-Federalist successors would debate its use, funding, and size, along 
with questions on how to maximally uphold the Constitution.    
 
Thomas Jefferson – the Anti-Federalist?  
 While his colleagues debated the Constitution’s merits, Thomas Jefferson was across the 
Atlantic serving as U.S. Minister to France. This precluded him from being a major player in the 
  
RES PUBLICA XXII |  26 
 
ratification conventions. As a result, Saul Cornell refrains from mentioning Jefferson in The 
Other Founders until his narrative on “Politics of the First Congress” (1999, 157). Thanks to the 
national archives, however, we can discern Thomas Jefferson’s stance on ratification according 
to his own words. In a letter dated March 13th, 1789, Thomas Jefferson responded to a curious 
friend with the following testimony:  
 
“I am not a federalist, because I never submitted… my opinions to the creed of any party of men… 
where I was capable of thinking for myself… Therefore I protest to you that I am not of the party 
of federalists. But I am much further from that of the Antifederalists. I approved from the first 
moment of... the new constitution, the consolidation of the government, the organisation into 
Executive, legislative and judiciary… What I disapproved from the first moment also was the want 
of a bill of rights to guard liberty against the legislative as well as executive branches of 
government… To these points of disapprobation I adhere.”  
 
 
 Jefferson expresses a qualified approval of Constitution, contingent on the passage of a 
Bill of Rights. His desire to refrain from choosing a faction evokes the principle of disinterested 
virtue. When we also consider that he routinely corresponded with Federalist leaders (e.g. James 
Madison), and had preferred his Notes on the State of Virginia to be circulated among colleagues 
rather than published (McDonald 1999, 176), it becomes easy to classify Jefferson as an elite 
Anti-Federalist. But we cannot ignore Jefferson’s admission of being “much further from… the 
Antifederalists” and his quick approval of consolidation. These revelations nudge Jefferson 
towards the Madisonian camp of Federalists.  
 Thomas Jefferson’s first major leadership role was the governorship of Virginia. He was 
elected in 1779 while the war for independence was still raging. Not many battles were fought on 
Virginian soil. However, the British used the colony’s coastal inlets as a pit-stop between their 
New York headquarters and main garrison in the Carolinas. Jefferson’s inexperience, along with 
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Virginia’s constitutional limits on the executive made it very difficult for him to protect his 
homeland from pillaging. Francis Cogliano describes how the Virginia constitution’s 
“deliberately diffused and decentralized executive power” hindered defensive responsiveness: 
“The governor had to work with an eight-man Council of State, whose members served at the 
pleasure of the legislature… [Jefferson] could not call out the militia… without first seeking 
advice of the council. In administrative terms, the governor and council should exercise… 
authority through the state Board of War appointed by the House of Delegates” (Cogliano 2014, 
15). 
The recurrent raids put Jefferson in a frustrating position. Oftentimes, the militia took too 
long to assemble and respond in time. It was also impossible to keep the militia constantly 
assembled; these men were not professional soldiers and had families to care for. A cycle of 
frequent assembly and disassembly carried its own risks. False alarms would discredit Jefferson 
among the militiamen and “alienate the populace” (Cogliano 2014, 19). If the governor did not 
pick - or guess - his battles wisely, he risked putting the state in severe jeopardy. For Jefferson to 
gather sufficient wisdom (i.e. information), though, he would need time. This compounded the 
militia’s slowness, and created an inescapable conundrum.  Without a large-scale, concerted 
defensive effort by the Virginians, Benedict Arnold’s troops were able to penetrate 125 miles in 
a matter of three days (Cogliano 2014, 19). They stormed Richmond and its neighboring towns, 
plundered public and private property, and disrupted the Continental Army’s flow of supplies to 
the southern colonies (Cogliano 2014, 21). Frustrated and discouraged, the governor would 
forego reelection. 
 To add insult to injury, Jefferson became subject to an inquiry by the Virginia assembly 
at the end of his term. Members of the assembly had brought forth 11 charges “related to his 
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conduct during Arnold’s invasion the previous winter” (Cogliano 2014, 28). Per one of the 
charges, they sought to investigate how Jefferson had instructed county magistrates to supply 
soldiers according to legislation that had expired days earlier, on New Year’s Day. Admittedly, 
Jefferson had undertaken such action. However, it was done out of necessity; Virginia was under 
attack and the assembly could not be summoned in time.  
According information gathered by Jefferson’s allies, and later admissions by the men 
involved, the bizarre investigation was part of a conspiracy. Several Virginian legislators had 
become apprehensive about the state’s security and remorseful of the extreme limits placed upon 
the governorship in 1776. As a remedy, they sought to establish a temporary dictatorship to keep 
Virginia safe, per Roman precedent (Cogliano 2014, 32). The conspirators knew that Jefferson 
would be likely to condemn such an idea. Therefore, they sought to discredit him and underscore 
the state’s vulnerability.  
The plot could not garner enough support in the Assembly and lost all relevance after the 
American victory at Yorktown in 1781. Meanwhile, Jefferson’s gubernatorial experiences would 
guide his statecraft for years to come. He rejected the militia as a sole guardian of liberty. On 
principle, it was alluring. However, when put to the test of practicality, the militia in his home 
state had failed. Its practical ineffectiveness was so severe that it tempted Jefferson’s colleagues 
to consider the unthinkable. They sought to mortgage their liberty to someone who would 
hopefully recuse himself after the need expired. In a twist of irony, Virginia’s militia had 
inspired the very despotism that Anti-Federalists later argued it would prevent. Even as the 
Revolutionary War was winding down, Jefferson promoted the idea of a regular army: “‘That it 
would be burdensome is undoubted, yet it is perhaps as certain that no possible mode of carrying 
it on can be so expensive to the public and so distressing and disgusting to individuals as by the 
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militia’” (Cogliano 2014, 37).  
While Jefferson’s experiences in Virginia put him at odds with the state constitution, his 
experiences abroad would lead to his frustration with the Articles of Confederation as well. As 
Minister to France, Jefferson also cooperated with John Adams – Minister to Britain – to oversee 
American relations with other Old World countries. Their biggest challenge was negotiating 
peace treaties with the Barbary States in the Mediterranean. Loosely aligned with the Ottoman 
Empire, these North African sultanates began seizing American merchant vessels and holding 
their crews for ransom in 1784 (Cogliano 2014, 43).  
Congress refrained from authorizing a naval build-up, but it allocated a small amount of 
funds to be used in the negotiations (Cogliano 2014, 52). This approached worked well with 
Morocco, whose leader “sought a commercial treaty… and was willing to make concessions” 
(Cogliano 2014, 55). Yet when Jefferson and Adams sent a merchant consul to negotiate with 
Algiers, they ended up frustrated. The American consul grossly exceeded his ransom budget, but 
wasn’t able to free any crewmembers or negotiate a peace settlement (Cogliano 2014, 57). John 
Adams, while less intent on using force compared to Jefferson, conceded that unlike Europeans, 
American negotiators were “‘armed only with innocence and the olive branch’” (Cogliano 2014, 
59). The troubles Jefferson experienced in the Old World epitomized America’s security 
struggles under the Articles of Confederation. Consensus-based voting, weak fundraising 
capabilities, and reliance on volunteerism prevented the American government from ensuring the 
safety of its citizens.  
 
Fries’ Rebellion and Hamilton’s Army 
 Thomas Jefferson returned to the U.S. to serve as George Washington’s Secretary of 
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State. He would soon find himself in a contentious position with other cabinet members, namely 
Alexander Hamilton. The two men turned out to have fundamentally different views on the same 
document they had supported a few years prior. Elvin Lim contends that for us “to recall what 
the Federalists stood for, is not enough to consult the Federalist Papers, which were written… to 
win over an Anti-Federalist audience” (2013, 35). True Federalist intentions would be best-
discerned by examining their early initiatives under the Washington presidency. Playing upon 
the Constitution’s ambiguities, Alexander Hamilton quickly began pushing for a large expansion 
of federal powers. In contrast, Madison and Jefferson strictly viewed the Constitution as a 
stronger safeguard of the First Founding’s negative rights. Upset at Federalists’ broad use of fiat 
in the extended republic, they started the Democratic-Republican movement. 
 In contrast to Alexander Hamilton’s flexible interpretation of the Constitution, it is easy 
to label Jefferson as a “strict constructionist”; someone who interpreted the document literally 
and renounced anything not explicitly permitted by it. This label of Jefferson stands at odds with 
his later actions. A military academy was hardly more justified by the clause in Article 1-8 
permitting Congress “To raise and support Armies...” than Hamilton’s National Bank was 
justified by the clause “To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix 
the Standard of Weights and Measures.” This discrepancy may point some observers to dismiss 
Jefferson as a hypocrite who became corrupted by power.  
 David N. Mayer insists the reason why Jefferson used a flexible approach towards West 
Point in 1801, but decried Hamilton’s economic policies ten years earlier, was because the bank 
was an inward institution that failed to pass “the most stringent test of necessity” and “would 
exercise powers in conflict with many state laws” (Mayer 2004, 59). Institutions with an outward 
focus, which were monopolized by the national government, could be more liberally addressed 
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by Jefferson. Although early clashes with Hamilton over vertical separation of powers created 
mistrust, the two men’s outward activism allowed them to collegially manage the army for the 
time being.   
 Throughout the early 1790s, Republicans cooperatively advocated for a smaller army. 
Unless there were obvious needs for expansion like in 1792 – when generals Harmar and St. 
Clair suffered embarrassing losses against Indian tribes – they advanced “arguments of utility 
and expense, not ideology” (Crackel 1987, 11). The only major internal discord during the 
decade’s earlier half was the Whiskey Rebellion. It was quickly put down by Washington, who 
led a force of 12,000 militiamen on a mission they were best suited for: internal policing 
(Crackel 1987, 11). While high Federalists blamed Democratic-Republican Societies for 
fomenting the revolt, Republican newspapers had not hesitated to denounce the anarchy (Cornell 
1999, 201). Additionally, the force that went into Pennsylvania had a roughly equal number of 
Federalists and Republicans (Crackel 1987, 11).   
Loyal opposition politics began to fall apart in 1795, though. The French Revolution’s 
aftermath had sparked war between England and France, which inflamed latent mistrust between 
the two parties across the Atlantic. In the coming years, “neither… party recognized the 
legitimacy of the others’ opposition” (Crackel 1987, 12). Federalists were branded as anglophiles 
who conspired to trample liberty. Republicans, meanwhile, were stereotyped as Jacobin 
francophiles who plotted their own insurrection.  
In 1798, the Federalists in power began to fuse national security politics with the 
everyday agenda. During the summer of that year, they passed the infamous Alien and Sedition 
Acts in order “to prepare for war [against France]...” (Cogliano 2014, 134). In particular, the 
“Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes… which called for the fines and imprisonment for 
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writing, speaking, or publishing anything of ‘a false, scandalous and malicious’ nature against 
the government or its officers” (Cogliano 2014, 134) did not take long to be used against the 
public, especially Republicans. Federalist judges used it to stifle Republican newspaper editors 
(Cornell 1999, 234). Even symbolic forms of protest, such as “liberty poles,” were prosecuted 
(Cornell 1999, 236).  
 To go with their new laws, the John Adams and Alexander Hamilton expanded the 
military. Nicknamed the “New Army,” it consisted of 12,000 men and predictably boasted 
Hamilton as its inspector general (Crackel 1987, 18). Federalists in Adams’ cabinet had made the 
expansions through an exclusionary method: “They screened officer applications personally. The 
slightest hint of Republican sympathies drew a telling note, ‘won’t do’” (Crackel 1987, 19). 
Officers made up only a small part of the army’s overall size, though. The volunteer ranks, 
which composed a bulk of the force “had a similar - even deeper - political tint. [Federalist] 
recruiters invited only men of correct political persuasion to join the ranks” (Crackel 1987, 19). 
Political amity was not enough to encourage men into the New Army ranks. They had to get 
paid, and the Federalist Congress instituted a property tax to raise funds (Crackel 1987, 19). This 
tax would spur a momentous, yet overlooked revolt in 18th century America.   
John Fries, a Pennsylvanian militia captain, and veteran of the Revolution and Whiskey 
Insurrection expedition, led a group of many former Federalists to chase away the tax collectors 
(Crackel 1987, 21). The government response was disproportionate from the beginning, and 
brought Republicans’ worst fears into a reality. Secretary of War James McHenry “urged the 
President to issue a proclamation that would condemn the actions as ‘overt acts of levying war 
against the United States’” (Crackel 1987, 22). Federalists had equated a small armed protest to a 
coup d’état or secession movement. Adams would authorize the use of federal volunteers to 
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restore order, yet militia troops were excluded from the police effort; even units from outside of 
Pennsylvania (Crackel 1987, 23).  
High federalist national security agenda showed its hand more and more. While 
Hamiltonians had never explicitly sought to abolish militias, their insistence on using an army of 
regulars and volunteers to quell the Fries rebellion demonstrated a severe lack of trust in local 
loyalty. Unlike George Washington in 1794, Hamilton showed preference for a national security 
model that rejected any state support. The problem with using regular troops exclusively, 
especially those recruited from the same background, was that they hardly identified with the 
locale they were sent to pacify. In one sense, New Army soldiers were polar opposites of the 
radical plebeian militiamen that had stormed Carlisle a decade earlier. They thoroughly 
embodied a distant, upper-class suspicion of the western frontier. Just like their antithetical rivals 
though, the New Army would display a similar degree of callousness against the public. 
 Newspapers reported how soldiers “came to restore ‘Peace and good Order,’ ...but, by 
their conduct, were more apt to excite the people to insurrection.’” (Crackel 1987, 24). Troops 
vandalized property. They even harassed elderly people, women, and children. Then, the soldiers 
took out their spite against journalists who had dared to speak out: “Jacob Schnider, the publisher 
of the staunchly Republican Adler… had scourged them regularly for their treatment of local 
citizens… Storming into his office, they grabbed him, ripped off his clothes, and dragged him 
into the street…” (Crackel 1987, 24). Theodore Crackel mentions how “unlike… 1794, when 
papers of both parties had urged against [The Whiskey] rebellion, the Fries affair drew sympathy 
from Republican and independent papers across the nation” (1987, 25).  
The scathing news would reach America’s highest office. Even John Adams, who had 
initially authorized the expedition, decided he could not be complicit in such abuses. As he 
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pardoned John Fries from a death sentence (Crackel 1987, 25), a shrouded division was 
developing among the Federalists. Adams had originally sought to take sensible precautions 
during the Quasi War, but “the Anglophile Federalists had come to their own delusion… [and] 
cast themselves in the role of strident and inept censors… [with a] desire to make of these 
emergency measures a permanent system” (McColley 1968, 29). George Washington’s passing 
uncovered this rift in December of 1799, as Adams Federalists quickly cooperated with 
Republicans to dismantle Hamilton’s army (Crackel 1987, 32). Within six months – twelve since 
the fateful rebellion – this coalition had stopped recruitment, suspended officer appointments, 
compelled the Secretary of War to resign, and completely disbanded the New and Provisional 
forces (Crackel 1987, 33). 
 The abuses by Hamilton’s New Army demonstrated the peril of using selective 
recruitment and promotion based on adherence to an ideology that prioritizes security over 
liberty. Today, one may refrain from judging its abuses too harshly. After all, a common culture 
regarding the Bill of Rights had yet to take hold. But, if the New Army had maintained its grip 
on America in the late 1700s, the legal precedents we currently take for granted might not exist. 
The doctrinaire soldiers recruited by Hamiltonians demonstrated the destructive extension of 
their ideology. They would have probably fared well against a foreign invasion. On their own 
though, they were unfit for upholding internal security.   
 
The Revolution of 1800 and West Point 
Thomas Jefferson entered the presidency in 1801 on a public mandate. The people and 
the electors had overwhelmingly voted Republican in the past year. He saw it as his duty to 
overhaul the federal government after a decade of Federalist influence. In current times, a 
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president’s first 100 days are used as a litmus test to understand their priorities. If we apply this 
test to Jefferson in 1801, our attention gets drawn to the military and West Point.  
First, it is vital to understand what kind of military institution Jefferson inherited. State 
militias existed in their many shapes and forms, but Jefferson already knew they were best suited 
in a supporting role. The New and Provisional armies had been disbanded; “The Old Army… 
was retained” (Crackel 1987, 33). Yet, here was a real chance many previous soldiers could re-
enter the service. A threat of war with France or Britain still loomed, and the administration 
wouldn’t be able to recruit selectively in wake of a crisis.  
Also, while Jefferson knew “the volunteers in Pennsylvania had proved… dangerous” 
(Crackel 1987, 32), his true concern lay with the small number of soldiers still in service. Over 
90% of the officers within the Old Army were Federalists appointed by Washington, Hamilton, 
and Adams (Crackel 1987, 175). Many of the high-ranking officers were some of Jefferson’s 
biggest political opponents and criticized him among military circles (Onuf 2004, 5). For years, 
Republicans were suspicious of a Federalist military becoming a caste; something like the 
Society of the Cincinnati, but less bound by the symbolism of past services and more inclined to 
conspire future actions.  
The military had just evidenced its gross tendency of abuse during the Fries rebellion; 
they had even bucked Hamilton’s advice of “discipline ‘and to prevent injury or insult to the 
inhabitants’” in 1799 (Crackel 1987, 26). While Hamilton may have dismissed the officers as 
simply incompetent, Jefferson viewed this group as an extreme extension of Hamilton’s 
statecraft: unscrupulously bent on ensconcing their own privilege: “here was a class of courtiers 
without a king… anxious to advance its corporate and personal interests at the people’s expense” 
(Onuf 2004, 4). Such men were especially dangerous in the fledgling Republic’s military, where 
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personal ties and honor outweighed a nascent sense of nationalism. Jefferson had to “unify the 
army around something else besides the ‘crucible of revolutionary combat’” (Onuf 2004, 11). 
Otherwise, he feared the army would become an exclusive, self-interested institution. Soldiers 
would foment conflict to earn a chance at experience and glory. Promotion would only come to 
those who displayed competence during combat, and had the right lineage. America would be 
stuck in a constant state of war, ultimately at the expense of its everyday citizens.   
In the summer of 1801, President Jefferson and his War Secretary, Henry Dearborn, 
began a quick and auspicious search process to staff a military academy at West Point according 
to past provisions. A 1794 law had designated West Point as garrison for the Corps of Artillerists 
and Engineers, providing them with ample space to train. The superior officers were originally 
tasked with buying books and tutoring cadets on how to build fortifications and aim cannons 
(Higginbotham 2004, 44). Memoirs by famous generals were exchanged throughout the ranks as 
tactical guides (Higginbotham 2004, 36). 1798 legislation authorized the appointment of 
specialized teachers at West Point, though no students - cadets - had even been appointed since 
1794 (Mayer 64). A fire at the garrison’s library and the Adams-Hamilton split had thwarted the 
school’s institutionalization until after Jefferson took office (Higginbotham 2004, 45). 
Jefferson and Dearborn seized upon this carte blanche, pressing Congress to approve 
legislation that would become the 1802 Military Peace Establishment Act. On the surface, it was 
sold as a stereotypically Republican piece of legislation; it sought to reduce the army’s size and 
save money (Crackel 1987, 45). But these savings were minimal, as would be the initial cuts. 
The Act did not relieve swaths of regulars, but rearranged the soldiers’ organization in such a 
way that less officers were needed (Crackel 1987, 45). Without surprise, the ones discharged 
were Federalists. 
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Additionally, the Act gave the president “exceptional powers over the new Corps of 
Engineers… not bound by traditional promotion by relative rank and seniority” (Crackel 1987, 
65). While Jefferson was free to mold the Corps of Engineers to his liking, a wrinkle in the 
legislation let him do more than flood the army with fort-builders: “Though Jefferson usually 
referred to West Point simply as a school of instruction for artillery... the fact is that newly 
commissioned graduates were assigned where they were needed” (Crackel 1987, 61). Thus 
began Thomas Jefferson’s “chaste reformation” of the army. 
In the following seven years, a Jeffersonian army took form. A core of regulars watched 
over the frontier and helped secure New Orleans upon its purchase from France, with tacit militia 
assistance. The president took an incremental but steady approach to filling the ranks with 
Republicans, even replacing officers who had shown “political apathy” (Crackel 1987, 50). He 
was careful not to provoke dissent among the Federalists, or jeopardize national security by 
trading experience for ideological allegiance too hastily. Nevertheless, the ranks were flipped by 
the time Jefferson would leave office: 90% of officers in the army were of a Republican 
background (Crackel 1987, 175). The few others were moderate “Republican Federalists.”  
The West Point academy was instrumental to this achievement. Theodore Crackel 
emphasizes that “if the commissioned ranks were to be accessible to all classes of citizens; if the 
aristocracy of wealth and birth in the army was to be replaced with the aristocracy of virtue and 
talent… education and training would have to be provided that would equip [men] to lead” 
(1987, 73). Thomas Jefferson sought to flood the ranks with Republicans who exhibited virtue in 
their applications. But, these men came from a diverse array of backgrounds, some of which 
were highly underprivileged. West Point’s instruction of battle tactics, math, geometry, and 
foreign language gave them the basic skills to earn a commission and lead alongside the 
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privileged sons of Federalists. The school was closely monitored by the President and Secretary 
of War; not only to keep an eye on its political mood, but also to keep it as cost-efficient as 
possible (Crackel 1987, 58).  
Jefferson’s military academy allowed him to cultivate virtue, and create a national 
security apparatus that was both energetic and constrained to our founding principles. It would 
be supplemented by state militias and if need be, and checked by them as well. The Jeffersonian 
soldier-citizen was an ideal balance between the citizen-soldier militiaman and Hamiltonian 
soldier. He would compensate the citizen-soldier’s impracticality by being paid, trained, and 
ready. Yet unlike the unrestrained Hamiltonian soldier, he would value liberty and represent 
America’s socioeconomic diversity.  
 
Conclusion – West Point as an American Political Development 
 While European monarchs consolidated power in the 18th century by creating large 
armies with the help of landed elites, Thomas Jefferson started the 19th century by designing an 
American army predicated on class diversity and allegiance to principles rather than people. An 
institution crucial to this exceptional product was the West Point Military Academy. In addition 
to facilitating Jefferson’s short-term transformation of the army’s ranks, “it established a source 
of Republican officers for the future” (Crackel 1987, 45). The academy’s foundation by Thomas 
Jefferson and Henry Dearborn presents a critical juncture, in which they instituted a durable shift 
in America’s national security framework.  
Slightly before Jefferson’s presidency, a national military already existed. It was 
complemented by state militia chapter as part of national security arrangement which allowed for 
collective action while safeguarding local interests. However, the national military became 
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hijacked by some of Thomas Jefferson’s most extreme political opponents. Their exclusive, 
hyper-partisan recruitment methods, and dismissal of state-level assistance created a security 
arrangement that was hardly representative of the American public, and therefore prone to 
commit abuses against it.   
Thus, what Jefferson’s military academy would do is ensure that the military possessed 
virtuous leadership and better represented the American social classes for decades. Evoking Bo 
Rothstein’s idea that “institutions set limits on what some agents can do… [and] construe an 
advantage in future political battles” (1992, 35) we can assert that Thomas Jefferson’s 
establishment of West Point created an institutional path dependency in American national 
security. This path dependency can be expressed in two simple ways. On one hand, future agents 
from less privileged classes would find it easier to access the military and participate in the 
execution of national security policy. The military may end up becoming a caste, but it would be 
an accessible one nonetheless. On the other hand, agents similar to Jefferson’s rivals would have 
an inherently harder time pushing policies of the Federalist decade. Such repression was hardly 
replicated after 1800. The Reconstruction Era comes to mind, but its context was much different. 
Jefferson’s durable reform of the national security framework perfectly illustrated a 
synthesis of the two American foundings that so often stand at tension. Elvin Lim considers 
American political developments as durable shifts of authority towards the federal level or away 
from it. Within this scope of understanding, West Point’s establishment echoes America’s 
Second Founding – an expansion of federal authority. Yet, by no means did the original 
proponents of the Second Founding – the Federalists – gain any power from this development. 
Thus, Saul Cornell was right in asserting that “while the Federalists won the battle of ratification, 
it is the ideas of the Anti-Federalists that continue[d] to define the soul of American politics.” 
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While creating West Point, President Jefferson infected the institution with his own political 
ideas that echoed our First Founding. In addition to promoting order, the military would be a tool 
to protect negative liberties. It would exhibit restraint against its own people, and compensate 
what it lacked in experience with training and knowledge. This formula was not perfect, 
evidenced by Jefferson’s controversial embargo of 1807, and American struggles against British 
redcoats in the War of 1812. However, the American people would remain free from military 
coercion until the Civil War – an unfortunate and complex chapter of American history. 
Jefferson’s creation of West Point to reform the military from illiberal leanings perfectly portrays 
the triumph of Anti-Federalists principles within the national security framework of the Second 
Founding.  
While celebrating this triumph though, we must stay tempered and recall Louis Hartz. 
His “Lockean Consensus” posits American political battles differently on the global scale, and is 
evidenced by the mere eight years it took Jefferson to achieve a more republican national 
security establishment. Although both factions insisted otherwise, the Federalists were hardly 
more aristocratic than the Carlisle Anti-Federalists were Jacobin. American aristocracy’s less-
entrenched status allowed Jeffersonian reforms to take hold quickly and without bloodshed. 
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Table 1: Competing Institutional Models for National Security 
 Hamiltonian Moderate 
Federalist 
Jeffersonian Anti-
Federalist 
radical 
 
control 
 
national 
national, 
supported by 
state gov’t 
national, 
supported by 
state gov’t 
state, 
supported by 
national gov’t 
 
local 
 
composition 
appointment 
& recruitment 
(partisan) 
appointment 
& recruitment 
(less partisan) 
appointment 
& recruitment 
(partisan)   
regulated 
voluntarism 
 
voluntarism 
character unscrupulous utilitarian virtuous 
(cultivated) 
virtuous 
(vetted)  
unscrupulous 
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